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The issue of context arises in assorted areas of Artificial Intelligence, Mathe­
matical Logic, and Natural Language Semantics. Although its importance is 
realized by various researchers, there is not much work towards a useful for­
malization. In this thesis, we will try to identify the problem, and decide what 
we need for an acceptable (formal) account of the notion of context. We will 
present a preliminary model (based on Situation Theory) and give examples 
to show the use of context in various fields, and the advantages gained by the 
acceptance of our proposal.
Keywords: Context, Knowledge Representation, Commonsense Reasoning, Sit­
uation Theory and Situation Semantics.
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Bağlam konusu Yapay Us, Matematiksel Mantık ve Doğal Dil Anlambiliminin 
çeşitli alanlarında karşımıza çıkar. Önemi değişik araştırmacılar tarafından 
farkedilmesine rağmen, kullanışlı bir formalizasyon konusunda fazla çalışma 
yapılmamıştır. Bu tezde sorunu tanımlamaya ve kabul edilebilir (formel) bir 
bağlam nosyonuna yönelik olarak neler yapılması gerektiğine karar vermeye 
çalışacağız. Durum Kuramına dayanan bir ön model önerdikten sonra, bağ­
lamın çeşitli konularda kullanımını ve önerilen modelin sağladığı avantajları 
gösteren örnekler vereceğiz.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Bağlam, Bilgi Gösterimi, Sağduyusal Akıl Yürütme, Du­
rum Kuramı ve Durum Anlambilimi.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The issue of context arises in various areas of Artificial Intelligence, Mathe­
matical Logic, and Natural Language Semantics. Although the term context 
is frequently used in explanations, proofs, etc. in these domains, its meaning 
is left to the reader’s understanding, i.e., it is used in an implicit and intuitive 
manner. However, when we are to implement a system, we have to make this 
notion explicit using, hopefully, a formal approach.
According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English 
[31, p. 184] the word “context” usually has two meanings: (i) the words around 
a word, phrase, etc. often used for helping to explain the meaning of the word, 
phrase, etc. (ii) the general conditions in which an event, action, etc. takes 
place. Clearly, the first meaning is closely related to linguistic meaning and 
linguists’ use of the word, whereas the second (more general) meaning is the 
one which is closer to our account of context in this thesis. In The Dictionary 
of Philosophy [4, p. 47], the word “context” is defined as follows:
context (L. contexere, “to weave together.” from con, “with,” 
and texere, “to weave” ): The sum total of meanings (associations, 
ideas, assumptions, preconceptions, etc.) that (a) are intimately 
related to a thing, (b) provide the origins for, and (c) influence our 
attitudes, perspectives, judgments, iuid knowledge of that thing.
From the above definitions, one may form a rough picture of the notion of 
context. In another dictionary {Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary
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[19, p. 305]), the associated meanings of “context” include the following:
1. The context of something consists of the ideas, situations, events, or 
information that relate to it and make it possible to understand it fully.
2. If something is seen in context or if it is put into context, it is considered 
with all the factors that are related to it rather than just being considered 
on its own, so that it can be properly understood.
3. If a remark, statement, etc. is taken or quoted out of context, it is 
only considered on its own and the circumstances in which it was said 
are ignored. It, therefore, seems to mean something different from the 
meaning that was intended.
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As noted by McCarthy [38], context plays an important role in common- 
sense reasoning. Whenever we state an axiom, we intend to use it in a certain 
context. If we want to be general, then we have to axiomatize in a high level of 
generality. This results in longer and complicated axioms which can nonethe­
less be stated in a compact way in a particular situation [38, 40]. So, by 
modeling contexts, we gain two important advantages [3]: (i) Economical: We 
can shorten our axioms, and (ii) Philosophical: We can eliminate the difficul­
ties associated with being fully general in the expression of facts, e.g., when we 
are working on a case which might never occur in real life, we can avoid the 
effects of this case on our other axioms.
In this thesis, our aim is to offer a useful formalization of context, one that 
can be used for automated reasoning in Artificial Intelligence, Computational 
Linguistics, and so on. To this end, we first identify the role of context in 
various fields such as Artificial Intelligence, Mathematical Logic, and Natural 
Language Semantics. Chapter 2 does this and may be considered as an account 
of the motivation for our study. In Chapter 3, w'e review some logic-based at­
tempts towards formalizing context. In that chapter, the focus of our discussion 
will be McCarthy’s proposal [40], which, in our view, is the groundwork for all 
other logicist formalizationsL
Our approach is inspired by the pioneering works of Barwise [8, 9] and *
*In addition to McCarthy, we will review his coworkers’ contributions. Attardi and Simi’s 
natural deduction based approach [5, 6] will also be studied in that chapter.
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Seligman [49], and will be presented using the notation and terminology of 
Situation Theory. In Chapter 4, we will give the necessary background to 
Situation Theory, and review the contributions of Barwise. In Chapter 5, we 
will advance our proposal, and discuss the handles that it offers on the issue 
of context. Then we will present examples, mostly taken from the available 
literature, so that we convince the reader that our formalization is at least as 
useful as the ones outlined previous approaches.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we will evaluate our approach and discuss its defi­
ciencies. Suggestions for improvement and plans for further research will also 
be made in this chapter.
Chapter 2
The Role of Context
In this chapter, we will examine the role of context in various fields, discuss 
possible applications, and in general try to answer the question “Why should 
we try to model context?” .
Although we focus our attention primarily on Natural Language and Rea­
soning, we will also review diverse areas some of which are related to Natural 
Language and Reasoning, some are not. This chapter may appear to be orga­
nized in a somewhat haphazard way; we will link the ideas in the upcoming 
chapters.
2.1 Context in Natural Language
Every natural language utterance occurs in a particular context. The meaning 
of the utterance and its interpretation, i.e., deciding the content of utterance, 
its truth value, the information carried out to the addressee by the utterance, 
and so on, are all context dependent. (Obviously, the ‘degree’ of context- 
dependence may vary.)
In this section, we present a simple (possibly trivial for human beings) 
segment of conversation, and begin to examine the role of context. The skeleton 
of the example is taken from Barwise [9, p. 27].
A (a woman, talking to B): /  am a philosopher.
4
B (talking to C): She is a philosopher.
C (talking to A): So, you are a philosopher.
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In this example, one of the very first context dependent things is the word 
“philosopher.” The meaning of this word is determined using the context of 
conversation. Although the above excerpt is not sufficient to carry the proper 
connotation of this word, our common understanding selects an appropriate 
meaning from a set of possible meanings^
In the above example, indexicals— “I,” “she,” and “you”—can be bound to 
appropriate persons only by the help of context. For example, the sentences 
uttered by A and B have the same content^, and we can only say this us­
ing some circumstantial information and conventions about the conversation^. 
(Demonstratives— “that,” “this,” and so on— have a similar dependency on 
the circumstance.) This circumstantial information might be formalized via 
context, so that in reasoning we can propose a formal procedure to deal with 
it^
Another role of context arises when we deal with quantifiers [23]. The 
range and interpretation of quantifiers depend on the context. For example, 
the quantifier “all” usually does not apply to all objects, but only to those of a 
particular kind in a particular domain, determined by the contextual factors. 
Another example might be the interpretation of the meaning of “many.” In 
an automobile factory, 10 automobiles might not qualify as “many,” but if a 
person owns 10 automobiles it counts as “many” (even the last interpretation *
* According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary [56, p. 522], the word “philosopher” may 
stand for any of the following: a reflexive thinker; a student of or specialist in philosophy; 
one whose philosophical perspective enables him to meet trouble calmly. In our example, it 
is the second meaning which is commonly evoked in the minds of the hearers of the word.
^The content of an utterance is considered in an intensional manner; namely we suppose 
the content of all the utterances in the example is the same: “A is a philosopher.”
^Anaphora might be considered as a superset of indexicals. The resolution of anaphora is 
a complex task because it requires finding the correct antecedent among many possibilities.
It involves syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic issues [50, 30], and introduction of the notion 
of context might give us a more uniform way of dealing with this problem. (Approaches to 
resolving anaphora using Situation Theory can be found in Gawron and Peters [23], and Tin 
and Akman [60].)
“'The representational aspects and the properties of context will be discussed in the follow­
ing chapters, and after formulating a clear proposal for context, we will re-visit this example 
in Section 5.2.5.
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is context dependent)®.
Context might be used to fill the missing parameters of some actions in 
natural language utterances. Consider an utterance of the sentence
Carl Lewis is running.
In this sentence, the place and time of the action are determined by the 
context. For example, if we are watching a competing Lewis on TV at the 1992 
Barcelona Olympic Games, the place and time of the utterance are different 
from what we would get if we are watching him practice from our window. 
Thus, in the first case the place of the “running” action is filled with the 
Olympic stadium at Barcelona and time of the “running” action is filled with 
August 1992. In the second case, the place is say, our front lawn and the time 
is say, June 1992.
In natural language there might be more than one meaning of a word (com­
mon examples are “pen” and “bank” ) and context is the most influential factor 
in determining the appropriate meaning. In the above utterance, if one does 
not know who Carl Lewis is, then “running,” too, could be interpreted differ­
ently.
Some of the natural language relations directly depend upon the context. 
A good example for this is an utterance of the sentence
Engineering Building is to the left of the Library.
In the general context of Bilkent Campus (cf. Figure 2.1), if we are watching 
the buildings from the Publishing Company, the utterance is true, but if we 
are in the Tourism School, the utterance is false. More interestingly, if we 
are looking from the Rector’s Residence, this utterance might be considered 
neither true nor false®. (The Library is behind the Engineering Building.)
®One might propose that “many” can only be interpreted as a ratio. But even this idea 
has a contextual dependency on the ratio. In a class of students, half of the students cannot 
be considered as “many” to cancel a midterm exam, but surely must be regarded as "many" 
in an influenza epidemic.
®We can generalize to perspectives from this example [48, 14, 49]. In the following section, 
we will examine examples similar to this one from a “natural regularity” point of view. This 
example will also be re-visited after the elaboration of our proposal (cf. Section 5.2.3).




Figure 2.1. A partial view of the Bilkent Campus
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Finally, the effects of the environment, that is, the information coming 
through our five senses must be taken into account as a contextual factor or 
cis a contributor of the context.
After the above identifications, we can conclude that for natural languages 
a fleshing-out strategy [44, 33, 54], i.e., converting everything into decontextu- 
alized eternal sentences [43], cannot be employed since we do not always have 
full and precise information about the relevant circumstances.
2.2 Context in Categorization
Categorization is one of the basic mental processes of reasoning [16, 47]. We, 
as human beings, can categorize various types of objects, events, situations, 
etc, and our categorizations depend on the circumstance and perspective. In 
this section, we will give examples to show the role of context in categorization, 
and emphasize its connection to natural regularities [14, 49].
In [2], the following example is given to motivate a commonsense set theory:
In Springfield (home-town of Bart Simpson), there are three bar­
bers working for money, and one barber who does not work for 
money (since he has another job) but serves the community by 
shaving senior citizens on Sundays. If we look at the situation from 
a commonsense perspective, there are four barbers in town, but 
from say, the mayor’s point of view, there are only three (licensed, 
tax-paying, etc.) barbers.
From the example, it is clear that context (or perspective) plays an impor­
tant role in classification. In [2] and [55], Akman and I focused our attention 
on the membership relation (m) and introduced a context-dependent member­
ship. However, upon carefully reviewing the literature on natural regularities 
[48, 14, 11, 49] and categorization [47], we realized that we should begin to deal 
with this problem not in set theory but in a more philosophical and psychologi­
cal framework. With the help of [49] and [14], we can transfer the discussion to 
the domains of Situation Theory and cognitive science. Although our proposal
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for formalizing context does not offer an alternative way of capturing context 
in categorization, it uses some of the ideas from previous works [14, 49, 47].
Barwise and Seligman [14] use the analysis of natural regularities to point 
out to the role of context in categorization. Since categorization is one of the 
basic processes when we are to deal with regularities, this is a fruitful path 
for us to analyze the role of context. An example regularity from Seligman 
[49] is “Swans are white.” This is a typical example of natural regularity in 
the sense that it is both reliable and fallible. Natural regularities are reliable 
since they are needed to explain successful representation, knowledge, truth, 
and correct reference. And they are fallible since they are needed to account 
for misinterpretation, error, false statements, and defeasible reference. Swans 
are in general white, thus the regularity is reliable and explains a fact. There 
might be exceptions like the Australian Swans^, but this does not mean that 
the regularity does not hold. Here, the fundamental problem with isolating the 
essential properties of a regularity is that any statement of them depends on 
some context of evaluation, i.e., we should evaluate the regularity “Swans are 
white,” for say, European swans.
At this point, the reader might notice a correlation between non-monotonic 
reasoning and the role of context dependent factors in natural regularities 
[14, 49]. Although natural regularities are usually considered in philosophical 
discussions, they intuitively correspond to material implication in logic, and 
the effect of contextual factors is similar to the effect of non-monotonicity. The 
difference between the philosophical and the logical approaches is in the way 
that these two disciplines differ. In logic, implication and non-monotonicity are 
usually studied in a syntactic fashion, and the reasons behind the abnormali­
ties are usually left out of the scope of discussion and/or ignored. On the other 
hand, in the works of Seligman and Barwise, natural regularities are analyzed 
from different perspectives, ranging from a purely mathematical approach [11] 
to a strictly philosophical one [49, 14].
If we could completely describe the contextual factors, then the problem 
would go away and we would not require extra machinery. However, we should 
always include a “so forth” part to cover the unexpected contextual factors 
[51]. In many cases, it is simply impossible to state all of the related contextual
^Australian swans are usually black.
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factors [57, 58, 51]. Still, we must somehow be able to deal with contextual 
factors. This is why the introduction of some notion of context, and using this 
notion in categorization might be useful*.
2.3 Context in Reasoning and AI
In our discussion of the role of context in reasoning and AI, we will mainly 
study the motivations of McCarthy [40] and his co-workers [24, 52, 18, 5].
When we state something we do so in a context. Similar to our discussion 
on the role of context in natural language, in reasoning we interpret some 
predicates differently in different contexts. For example, 37 degrees centigrade 
is “high” in the context of a weather report, but “normal” in the context of 
medical diagnosis. In the context of Newtonian mechanics /  =  ma, but in 
the context of general relativity, this is hardly the case. The examples can be 
continued. The main point here is that if we are to reason in a common sense 
way, we have to use certain contexts.
The importance of the notion of context has realized by philosophers for 
centuries. Early on, philosophers recognized that a casual connection between 
two events holds only relative to a certain background, thus only in certain 
contexts. McCarthy was the first researcher to realize that the introduction of 
a formal notion of context is required for “generality” in AI [38].
According to McCarthy [38, 40], there is simply no most general context in 
which all the stated axioms always hold and everything is meaningful. When 
we write an axiom, it holds in a certain context, and one can always present 
another (more general) context in which the axiom does not hold.
Without really introducing a formal notion of context, we may choose to 
state our axioms in fairly high generality to cover a large domain. But in 
this ceise, the axioms become longer. The implementation of CYC, a large 
commonsense knowledge base and reasoning system, exemplifies this issue [26, 
25]. In this case, the system is quite general, and the axioms to cover the
®Note that, the discussions in [14] and [49] continue with the identification of the problem 
from the categorization point of view. However, we will not go into the details o f that.
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real word can only be stated in a lengthy way. The main question is “To what 
generality should we extend the axioms of the system?” . If we commit ourselves 
to the view that there is no most general context, our system will always have 
to be partial. At this point, McCarthy proposes the formalization of notion 
of context. By adding a context parameter to each function and relation, and 
employing non-monotonic reasoning methods, one can state axioms in a fairly 
simple way and use them by lifting to other contexts. (Lifting will be explained 
in Chapter 3.)
Another notion which is discussed by McCarthy is the formalization of 
relativized-truth-within-a-context via a special predicate. The predicate
holds((7, p)
is used to state that predicate p holds in context C
If we compare the two approaches, namely, holds and adding a context 
parameter to each function and predicate, we might choose holds, since it 
allows us to use the context uniformly as the other objects. The major problem 
with this approach is that, if we are to live in a first order world, we have to 
somehow reify [38, 24] p in holds(C ,p).
Between two contexts, we might consider a more general than relation (Ci :< 
C2) meaning that the second context contains all the information of the first 
context and probably more. (Intuitively, the second context is broader than 
the first one.) An example for two contexts related by :< is the context of 
Surav’s M.S. Thesis presentation and the context of Bilkent University M.S. 
Thesis presentations. Here, the second context is more general than the first 
one; in fact, the first one is obtained from the second by fixing the speaker to 
Surav, place to A-502, date to September 23rd, etc.
McCarthy proposes that providing operations such as entering and leaving 
might be useful for a logical system which uses contexts in a natural deduction 
sense [61]. However, McCarthy also states that taking contexts as a set of 
axioms (even as an infinite set of assumptions) is probably incorrect [38].
Among the advantages gained as a result of the use of contexts are the 
following [52]:
®In McCarthy’s newer work [40], holds is changed to ist(c ,p ). We will review McCarthy’s 
more recent thinking in the next chapter.
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• Economy o f representation: Different contexts can limit the parts of the 
knowledge base that are accessible in different ways, effectively allowing 
the representation of knowledge base in a single structure.
• Economy o f reasoning: By factoring out a possibly very large knowledge 
base, context may permit much more efficient reasoning about the real, 
intended scope.
• Allowing inconsistent knowledge bases: The knowledge base might be 
partitioned according to the context of its use. In this way, we might 
have contradicting knowledge in the same knowledge base, but this does 
not cause any problems.
• Flexible semantics: By using context, we can easily choose the appropri­
ate interpretation of possibly ambiguous terms. A good example is the 
use of the word “glasses” : the appropriate meaning would be different in 
the context of a wine-and-cheese party and in the context of a visit to an 
ophthalmologist.
• Flexible Entailment: Context might effect the entailment relation. For 
example, in a particular context, entailment might warrant a closed world 
assumption [45] whereas in some other context, this assumption might 
not be dropped.
Being the largest commonsense knowledge building attempt, CYC [26, 27] 
has very important pointers on reasoning with an explicit notion of context [24, 
25, 32]. Some aspects of the representation of knowledge which are influenced 
by contextual factors include [25]:
• Vocabulary: The vocabulary (i.e., the predicates, functions, and cate­
gories) used for representation should be chosen to be appropriate for 
their intended domain. For example, Mycin and Oncocin [53] overlap 
significantly in their domains; however Oncocin has some concept of time 
whereas Mycin does not. This is because these two programs are used 
for different tasks, thus in different contexts. •
• Granularity and accuracy: As with the vocabulary, the application area, 
thus context, determines the granularity and accuracy of the theory.
CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF CONTEXT 13
• Assumptions: The assumptions that the task allows often lead to a sim­
plification of the vocabulary. If we try to continue this simplification for 
large domains, at one point the assumptions become unstable. Thus, 
either we should use a highly expressive vocabulary or distribute the 
assumptions to different tasks.
CYC researchers identify two approaches to building large commonsense 
knowledge bases, and reasoning over them [25].
The straightforward way that a knowledge base builder might choose would 
be the introduction of an extremely expressive and powerful vocabulary. This 
approach increases the complexity of the problem, since using such a vocabu­
lary causes difficulties in truth maintenance, and produces a very large search 
space.
The second way, also the CYC researchers’ way, is to make the context 
dependence of a theory explicit. In this approach, cissertions (axioms, state­
ments) are not universally true; they are only true in a context. An assertion 
in one context might be available for use in a different context by performing 
a “relative decontextualization”
In reasoning, the ways of using a formal notion of context include the fol­
lowing:
• A general theory of some topic: A theory of mechanics, a theory of 
weather in winter, a theory of what to look for when buying cars, etc. 
In CYC, such contexts are called the “micro-theories” [26, 24]. Differ­
ent micro-theories make different assumptions and simplifications about 
the world. For any topic, there might be different micro-theories of that 
topic, at varying levels of detail and generality*^
• A basis for problem solving: For some difficult problems, we can form a 
particular context. We collect all related assumptions, rules, etc. in that 
context (called the Problem Solving Context (PSC) in CYC [25, 26, 27]), *
*°This process is intuitively the explication of the names of the contexts and constructing 
a new context which considers assumptions together with their context.
**As a technical point, by keeping different theories distinct, the problem of coherence is 
transformed from that of maintaining global consistency to maintaining local consistency, 
which in practice is simpler.
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and can process a query (or a group of related queries) in a relatively 
small search space. Such contexts must be created dynamically and be 
disposed of afterwards. •
• A context-dependent representation of utterances: For example, we can 
use anaphoric and indefinite statements without completely “decontex- 
tualizing” them. In this way, for example, the words “the person” might 
be used in a discourse without identifying him/her exactly.
Chapter 3
Previous Formalizations in Logic
The notion of context was first introduced to AI in a logicist framework by 
McCarthy in his 1971 Turing Award talk. (This talk was later published as 
[38].) After that introduction, research on the topic was quite silent until 
the late eighties. McCarthy published his recent ideas on context in [40], a 
pioneering work by all means. Other notable works on formalizing context are 
due to Guha [24], Shoham [52], Buvac and Mason [18, 17], and Attardi and 
Sirni [5, 6].
We have reviewed McCarthy’s early ideas [38] in Chapter 2. In this chapter, 
we will review the other logicist formalizations, starting with McCarthy’s more 
recent proposal. The order of the review will be more or less a chronological 
one: McCarthy; Guha; Shoham; Buvac and Mason; Attardi and Simi.
3.1 McCarthy on Contexts
In his most recent work [40] McCarthy states three reasons for introducing the 
formal notion of context.
First, the use of context allows simple axiomatizations. He exemplifies 
this by stating that axioms for static blocks world situations can be lifted^
^The term lifting is used very frequently in this thesis. By lifting a predicate (or formula, 
axiom, etc.) from one context to another, we mean transferring that predicate (or formula, 
axiom, etc.) to the other context (with appropriate changes, if necessary).
15
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to contexts involving fewer assumptions— to contexts in which the situation 
changes.
Second, contexts allow us to use a specific vocabulary of and information 
about a circumstance. An example for this might be the context of a (coded) 
conversation in which particular terms have particular meanings that they 
would not have in the language in general. A more concrete use (from Com­
puter Science) can be identified, if we form an analogy with programming 
language and database concepts. McCarthy’s approach might correspond to 
the use of local variables and local functions in programming languages, and 
views in database systems. In each case, the meaning of a term depends upon 
the context in which it is used.
McCarthy’s third goal is to propose a mechanism, by which we can build 
AI systems which are never permanently stuck with the concepts they use at a 
given time because they can always transcend the context they are in. In our 
view, this brings about two problems:
• When to transcend a context?
Either the system must be smart enough to do so or we must instruct 
it when to transcend one level up. In the current state-of-the-art, both 
solutions are quite difficult.
• Where to transcend?
McCarthy says [40, p. 1] “Formulas is t (c ,p ) are always considered as 
themselves asserted within a context, i.e., we have something like 
is t (c ', is t (c ,p )). The regress is infinite but we will show that it is 
harmless.” ^
The basic relation relating contexts and propositions is is t (c ,p ). It asserts 
that proposition p is true in context c. Then the main formulas are sentences 
of the form
c ': ist(c,p) (3.1)
^McCarthy is not convincing at this point. He, in our view, does not prove that tliis kind 
of nesting is harmless; he simply ignores that nesting. In addition to that, do we really need 
to transcend one level up, that is, to a level which cannot provide us with fruitful information 
or methods for our problem? How do we stop transcending and decide that our problem 
cannot be solved within our theory?
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In other words, p is true in context c, and this itself is asserted in an outer 
context c'.
Some properties of context include the following:
1. Contexts are abstract objects.
McCarthy says [40, p. 1] “We do not offer a definition [of contexts], 
but we will offer some examples.” Some contexts will be rich objects^ 
e.g., the situations in Situation Calculus'*. Some contexts will not be as 
rich (that is, poor and might be completely described), e.g., some simple 
micro- theories [24].
2. Contexts are first class objects.
We can use contexts in our formulas in the same way we use other 
objects®.
3. There are some relations working between contexts.
The most notable one is the more general than (:^) relation. This defines 
a partial ordering over contexts. Using we can lift a fact from a context 
to one of its super-contexts using the following non-monotonic rule:
Vci Vc2 Vp (ci :< C2) A ist(ci,p) A ->061(01, C2,p) —► ist(c2,p)
Here, C2 is a super-context of ci and p is a predicate of ci. (Here, o 6l 
is an abmormality predicate and ->a6l(ci,C 2,p) is used to support the 
non-monotonicity.) In other words, the above rule is a trivial (and basic) 
lifting rule from a context to its super-context. Interestingly, we can state 
a similar lifting rule between a context and one of its sub-contexts:
Vci Vc2 Vp (c i ■< C2) A i s t ( c 2,p )  A ->c62(ci,C 2,p) —> i s t ( c i , p )
Note the difference between the abnormality relations (o61 and ab2). 
Intuitively, o6l represents the abnormality in generalizing to a super­
context, whereas o62 corresponds to the abnormality in specializing to a 
sub-context.
rich object cannot be defined or completely described. A system may be given facts 
about a rich object but never the complete description [24].
''In our conception, Situation Calculus is totally different than Situation Theory and 
Situation Semantics. More information on Situation Calculus can be found in [36, 28] and 
on Situation Theory and Situation Semantics in [13, 10, 20].
®In our opinion, this is somewhat luxurious for the time being, but having this property 
will do no harm.
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4. There are some functions to form new contexts by specialization.
One example McCarthy uses is the function specialize-time{t,c) which 
returns a context related to context c in which the time is specialized to 
have the value t. We will return to this example in Section 3.1.1.
5. There are some relations and functions which take contexts as arguments. 
The function value{c, t) returns the value associated with term t in con­
text c. We will re-examine this function in Section 3.1.1.
6. Lifting Rules.
According to McCarthy [40], the main goal of the use of contexts is to 
simplify axiomatizations (by allowing us to lift axioms from one context 
to another). Therefore, one of the properties of context should be its 
support of the lifting rules. Lifting rules are always asserted in an outer 
context which should be capable of supporting such rules. We will exam­
ine this issue in more detail in Section 3.1.2 and study an example due 
to McCarthy in Section 5.2.1.
7. Linguistic vs. Factual Presuppositions.
Context might have both linguistic presuppositions and factual presuppo­
sitions. An example for a linguistic presupposition might be the demon­
stratives and indexicals used in an utterance. An example for a factual 
presupposition might be the objects which occur in a context, i.e., per­
sons, things, etc. [39].
Now, let us give an example on the use of i s t  formulas:
Co : ist(con<exf-o/(“Sherlock Holmes stories” ), “Holmes is a detective” )
asserts that it is true in the context of Sherlock Holmes stories that Holmes is a 
detective. (The use of English quotations is original with McCarthy; the formal 
notation is still undecided.) Here, Cq is considered to be the outer context^.
3.1.1 Relations and Functions Involving Contexts
In [40], McCarthy proposes some functions and relations involving contexts. 
These are usually employed when we state lifting rules.
^Notice, on the other hand, that in the context conteiZ-o/f “Sherlock Holmes stories” ), 
Holmes’s mother’s maiden name does not have a value.
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• value{c,t) is a function which returns the value of term t in context c:
value{context-of {^Sherlock Holmes stories” ),
“number of wives of Holmes” ) =  0
This states that Holmes has no wife in the context of Sherlock Holmes 
stories’ .^
• sp€cialize-time{t, c) is a context related to c in which the time is special­
ized to the value t:
Co : ist{specialize-tim e{t,c),at{jm c, Stanford))
which states that at time t of context c, John McCarthy is at Stanford 
University.
Instead of specialize-time, it might be convenient to use the predicate 
specializes-time{t^ci^C2) and the axiom
Co : specializ€s-time{t,ci,C2) A is t (c i,p ) —» ist{specialize-tim e(t,cl),p)
in which, via specializes-time, context ci specializes to C2 at time t. 
(Thus, specialize-time(t,ci) =  C2.) The above axiom relates the func­
tion specialize-time to the predicate specializes-time. The introduction 
of the new predicate allows us to state lifting rules that have to do with 
time.
Instead of specializing on time, we can specialize on location, speaker, 
situation, subject matter, and so on.
^The interpretation of value(c,t) involves a problem that does not arise with is t(c ,p ), 
namely, the space in which terms take values may itself be context dependent. McCarthy 
says [40, p. 2] that many applications would not require this much generality, and this 
assignment o f values to terms might be considered in a fixed domain, i.e., a domain which 
does not necessitate context dependency.
In our view, we can easily state value(c, t) as an i s t  formula:
value(c,t) =  u is t (c , < =  u)
If we accept the above equivalence, the previous problem reduces to context dependence of 
=  in an i s t  formula. This obviously does not warrant any further study, since is t  formulas 
were introduced to resolve this problem, i.e., the context dependence of predicates, in the 
first place. However, it might be thought that the reduction of value to i s t  results in a loss 
of expressive power o f the lifting rules. But, this is not the case either: the expressive power 
of lifting rules is not lessened. (This fact is proved by Buvac and Mason [18], together with 
some other mathematical properties o f i s t  formulas.)
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• assuming{p, c) is another context like context c in which predicate p is 
assumed (in the natural deduction sense). Using this function, we might 
dynamically create a context containing the axioms that we desire.
3.1.2 Lifting and Other Advanced Issues
The main motivation of McCarthy in introducing contexts as formal objects 
was to simplify axioms and increase their generality by using them in various 
contexts. In his account, lifting rules transfer axioms from one context to 
another and are the only way of relating a context to another. Using lifting 
rules, we can do the following while we are transferring an axiom:
1. No operation.
If two contexts are using the same terminology for a concept in an axiom, 
this is a natural choice. For example, the following lifting rule states that 
we can use the axioms related to on(x,y) relation of above-theory context 
in general-blocks-world context without any change:
Co : VxVy ist{above-theory,on{x,y))
ist{general-blocks-world, on{x, y))
2. Change the arity o f a predicate.
In different contexts, the same predicate might take a different number of 
arguments. McCarthy’s example for this is the on predicate which takes 
two arguments in above-theory context, and three arguments in a context 
c in which on has a third argument denoting the situation®. The lifting 
rule is the following:
Co : VxVyVs ist{above-theory, on{x.^y)) ist{context-of(s), o n {x ,y , s))
where context-of is a function returning the context associated with the 
situation s in which the usual above-theory axioms hold.
3. Change the name of a predicate.
Similar to the case with arities, we can change the name of a predicate
®Once again, here the word “situation” is used in the Situation Calculus sense.
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via lifting rules. For example, we can change on to üzerinde, when we 
move from above-theory to turkish-above-theori^:
Co : V.rVy ist{above-theory,on{x,y))
—+ ist(turkish-above-theory, üzerinde(x ,y ))
The most important property of lifting rules is their non-monotonicity. 
Without non-monotonicity, we cannot use lifting effectively, i.e., we cannot 
use the lifting rules in the level of generality that we desire, and might run into 
difficulties simitar to the ones encountered in natural regularities [14, 49], cf. 
Section 2.2. McCarthy proposes circumscription [37] as a tool to implement 
non-monotonicity.
When we take contexts in the natural deduction sense (as McCarthy sug­
gested [38]), the operations of entering and leaving a context might be useful 
and shorten the proofs involving contexts. In this case, is t (c ,p ) will be analo­
gous to c p, and the operation of entering c can be taken as assuming{p, c). 
Then, entering c and inferring p will be equivalent to is t (c , p) in the outer 
context.
Relative decontextualization is another issue raised by McCarthy’s work. He 
criticizes Quine’s notion of eternal sentences^®, because there is no language in 
which eternal sentences can be expressed. McCarthy proposes a mechanism of 
relative decontextualization to do the work of eternal sentences. The mecha­
nism depends on the premise that when several concepts occur in a discussion, 
there is a common context above all of them into which all terms and predi­
cates can be lifted. Sentences in this context are relatively eternal. A similar 
idea is used in the Problem Solving Contexts (PSC) of CYC [25].
Another advanced problem in which context might be useful is the notion 
of mental states [40]. McCarthy thinks of mental states as outer contexts. The 
advantage of representing mental states as outer contexts is that we can include 
the reasons for having a belief. Then, when we are required to do belief revision
®Note that, in the above examples, the lifting rules are always stated in an outer context, 
Co, so that i s t  formulas can be used without any paradoxical (circular) side effects [12]. 
Attardi and Simi [5] criticize McCarthy for his unclear use of lifting rules, and prove that if 
a condition for stating lifting rules in outer contexts is not asserted, lifting rules might result 
in paradoxes, cf. Section 3.5.
^^Eternal sentences are introduced in [43], and are assumed to be sentences whose meanings 
do not depend upon context.
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[35], the inclusion of the reasons for having a belief simplifies our work. When 
we use beliefs as usual (i.e., no belief revision is required), we simply enter the 
related context and use beliefs.
3.2 Guha on Contexts
Guha encountered the problem of context while he was working on building a 
large commonsense knowledge base, namely, CYC [26, 27]. (In the previous 
chapter, we have reviewed the advantages of contexts in knowledge engineer­
ing.)
According to Guha, properties of contexts should be similar to those found 
in McCarthy [38, 40]. Guha models contexts with micro-theories. Micro­
theories are theories of (usually) limited domains. For example, we may collect 
the basic (naive) knowledge of buying and selling into a set of axioms, and may 
call it the “Commonsense Micro-Theory of Money” [22]. Intuitively, micro­
theories are the context’s way of seeing the world, and are considered to have 
the following two basic properties: (i) there is a set of axioms related to each 
micro-theory, and (ii) there is a vocabulary which tells us the syntax and 
semantics of each predicate and each function specific to the micro-theory. 
Similar to McCarthy’s conception, micro-theories are interrelated via lifting 
rules stated in an outer context.
i s t  predicates form the basis of Guha’s proposal. Guha first identifies 
the desirable properties of contexts, using a purely technical approach to the 
problem (since he had his motivation from CYC). He studies ways of using 
contexts effectively in reasoning, including the following:
• Contexts might be useful in putting together a set of related axioms. In 
this way, contexts are used as a means for referring to a group of related 
assertions (closed under entailment) about which something can be said. •
• They can be used as a mechanism for combining different theories. If 
the assertions in one context were not automatically available in other 
contexts, the system might as well be a set of disconnected knowledge 
bases. Therefore, by using lifting rules, different micro-theories may be
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integrated.
• They might be useful in limiting the scope of a theory.
• Using contexts, we might have multiple models of a task. For example, 
regarding the task of finding out what to do in case of fire, we may offer 
different models for a workplace and for a house. In a workplace, the first 
thing to do may be to take away a file of letters, whereas, in a house, the 
children must be saved first^ .^
• Contexts might be used in natural language understanding and represen­
tation.
Being the most important component of his system, lifting is studied by 
Guha in detail. The basic use of lifting in Cuba’s proposal is the formation 
of a problem solving context to transfer the axioms of different micro-theories 
to a PSC (cf. Section 2.3). In this way, different assertions might be made 
in different contexts and when solving a problem, the system pulls together 
information from different contexts by way of lifting axioms.
The most important property of lifting rules is their ability to preserve 
meaning. For example, lifting rules might be used to transfer facts from a 
(source) context to another (target) context. In the target context, the scope of 
quantifiers, the interpretation of objects, and even the vocabulary may change. 
Therefore, when we state a lifting rule, we must take all the possible outcomes 
into account. In the case of natural language, the problem becomes more 
complicated since indexicals come into play.
Lifting rules should be definitely non-monotonic as we stated in the previous 
section. Guha uses default reasoning [26, 24, 25] in the statement of lifting 
rules. Cuba’s intuitions about the general lifting rules might be collected into 
three categories:
• Default Coreference: Although there will be differences among contexts, 
it can be expected that there will be significant similarities and overlaps. 
As a result, a significant number of terms in different contexts refer to
“ Clearly, if there were children in the workplace, they would surely be more important. 
However, we are assuming that there are no chilren in the workplace.
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(mean) the same thing. Thus, such terms can be lifted from one context 
to another without any modification. Similar to terms, we can expect 
a significant overlap in many formulas, which may be lifted from one 
context to another without any change. Therefore, it will be a great 
simplification if we assume that a lifting operation will not require any 
modification, unless it is explicitly stated that there should be a change.
• Compositional Lifting: Between contexts, there might be differences in 
vocabularies (both in the words used, and in the intended denotations of 
these words). In this case, specifying lifting rules for individual predicates 
(and functions) should be enough for the system to use these rules in the 
lifting of formulas involving these predicates. For example, the following 
lifting rule
Vx is t (c i, ia //(x)) —)· i s t { c 2, tall{x, Person)) 
should be enough for the system to lift from
is t {c i , tall{A) A tall{B))
to
is t (c 2, tall{A, Person) A tall{B, Person))
Coherence: Since Guha uses lifting in a completely syntactic sense, there 
is a need for coherence maintenance. For example, in context Ci, tall 
might be a unary predicate, and in contexts C2 and C3, it might be a 
binary predicate such that in C2, the second argument is a parameter 
for a population (e.g., tall{Fred, Soccer-Player)), and in C3, the second 
argument is a quality (e.g., tall{Fred, Very)). In this case, the lifting 
rules must be stated in a way that the senses of tall should not be mixed 
up in another context, say C4. Therefore, when lifting different axioms 
involving a certain predicate from one context to another, we have to 
ensure that the lifted forms of the axioms use this predicate coherently 
and in the same sense.
We will return to these intuitions when we present our proposal in Chapter 5.
In the formalization phase, Guha gives the syntax and semantics of the 
logic of contexts. In the syntax part, he introduces a set of (rich) objects called
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contexts, a set of constant symbols, etc., and extends the first order logic to use 
contexts. The most important part is the construction of a context structure. 
A context structure intuitively defines a context’s way of describing the world 
[24, p. 20]. After an outline of syntax, Guha describes the proof theory for 
his proposal and gives some examples. The issue of lifting is analyzed and it 
is shown that the proposal is capable of doing the essentials of lifting.
After the formalization, Guha gives examples of lifting and shows ways of 
using context in building and reasoning with a large knowledge base. The ex­
amples are valuable to demonstrate the practical aspects of contexts, however, 
we will not present them since they are concerned with a rather large “Car 
Selection” module of CYC and there are many related micro-theories in each 
example. The reader may refer to Cuba’s thesis [24, pp. 67-140 and 165-178] 
for details.
Cuba’s proposal is rather similar in spirit to that of McCarthy except that 
it is motivated from a real problem, namely CYC, and works fine in this target 
domain. Although the proposal accommodates any level of nesting on context, 
in CYC there are basically two levels: (i) micro-theories, and (ii) the default 
outer level. The lifting rules and general facts are stated in the outer level, and 
the problem is solved by the construction of PSC under this level, unless the 
problem is local to a micro-theory.
3.3 Buvac and Mason on Contexts
Buvac and Mason [18] (and in a more recent work, Buvac, Buvac, and Mason 
[17]) approach context from a purely mathematical viewpoint. They inves­
tigate the simple logical properties of contexts. They also use is t (c ,p ) to 
denote context-dependent truth. Using this modality, they extend the classi­
cal propositional logic to what they call the propositional logic of context. In 
their proposal, each context is considered to have its own vocabulary—a set of 
propositional atoms which are defined (or meaningful) in that context.
Buvac and Mason discuss the syntax and semantics of a general propo­
sitional language of context, and give a Hilbert-style proof system for this 
language. Their main results are the soundness and completeness proofs of
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this system. They also provide soundness and completeness results for various 
extensions of the general system, and prove that their logic is decidable.
Their system has the following two features [18]:
1. A context is modeled by a set of partial truth assignments which describe 
the possible states of affairs of that context. Then, the ist modality is 
interpreted as validity: ist(c,p) is true iff the propositional atom p is 
true in all the truth assignments associated with context c. Since defining 
is t  in terms of validity rather than truth leads to a more general system, 
Buvac and Mason did it in this way. In their system, ist is interpreted 
as truth obtained by placing simple restrictions on the definition of a 
model, and enriching the set of axioms.
2. The nature of particular contexts is itself context dependent. The ex­
ample of Buvac and Mason for this is the context of Tweety, which has 
different interpretations when it is considered in a non-monotonic rea­
soning literature context, and when it is considered in the context of 
Tweety & Sylvester (a popular cartoon). This property leads us to con­
sider a context as a sequence of individual contexts rather than a solitary 
context. In Buvac and Mason’s terminology this property is known as 
non-flatness of the system. The acceptance of a sequence of contexts 
respects the intuition that what holds in a particular context can depend 
on how this context is reached.
We will not go any further into the details of their system but just note the 
extensions related to McCarthy’s work:
• Lifting is mathematically analyzed and used, rather than just to exem­
plify the issue. Buvac and Mason advance a way of stating lifting rules 
so that a fact from one context might be used in another context. •
• Although McCarthy does not offer, in our view, a satisfactory mathe­
matical account of why there is no outermost context, Buvac and Mason 
show that the acceptance of the outermost context simplifies the meta­
mathematics of the contexts. They first assume that there is no outer­
most context and build a proof system on this assumption. Then, they
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show that introducing the outermost context only simplifies the way they 
are dealing with non-flatness.
3.4 Shoham on Contexts
Shoham [52] uses the alternative notation to denote that predicate p holds 
in context c. According to Shoham, every proposition is meaningful in every 
context [52, p. 400], but the same proposition might have different truth 
values in different contexts. Thus, his approach is quite different compared to 
the approaches of McCarthy, Guha, and Buvac and Mason.
Shoham describes a propositional language depending on his more general 
than relation (i)). The relation defines a weak partial ordering between con­
texts; not every pair of contexts are comparable under it. The most important 
question related to j) is that “Is there a most general (or most specific) con­
text?” Mathematically this corresponds to the question “Is there an upper (or 
lower) bound on D?” In Shoham’s proposal, the question is not answered, but 
when the system is analyzed the existence of the most general and the most 
specific contexts is considered.
The language Shoham describes is quite similcir to that of the FOL but 
his relations I), V, A, and A work over contexts. Here, xAy is defined as the 
greatest lower bound on x and y with respect to D (if it exists). Similarly, xVy 
is defined as a least upper bound of the contexts x and y (if it exists). When 
defined, Ax ¡s the context which is not comparable*^ to x under j). A context 
set is and-closed if it is closed under conjunction, or-closed if it is closed under 
disjunction, and-or-closed if it is both, not-closed if it is closed under negation, 
and simply closed if it is all three. From these definitions, we see that if an 
or-closed context set contains both x and Ax for some x, then the context 
set contains the most general context, i.e., the tautological context. Similarly, 
under the same condition, an and-closed context set contains the most specific 
context, i.e., the contradictory context.
*^Here, by the term not-comparable, we mean that each context contains some axioms 
which are not contained in the other context.
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After the identification of the above properties of his system, Shoham com­
pares the language of contexts with the language of propositions. Drawing on 
an intuitive analogy between a context c and a predicate current-context-is(c), 
Shoham identifies the set of contexts with the set of propositions. Using this 
identification, he defines truth in a context, i.e., in terms of conventional im­
plication, i.e., current-context-is(c) p. Then, using a dozen or so benchmark 
sentences, Shoham characterizes this implication, and points out an interesting 
interaction between contexts and modal operators*^.
3.5 Attardi and Simi on Contexts
Attardi and Simi [5, 6] offer a “viewpoint” representation which primarily de­
pends on the view of context in a natural deduction sense. According to Attardi 
and Simi, contexts are sets of reified sentences of the FOL.
The main purpose of Attardi and Simi [5] is to present a formalization of the 
notion of viewpoint as a construct meant for expressing varieties of relativized 
truth. The formalization is done in a logic which extends FOL through an 
axiomatization of provability and with the proper reflection rules.
The basic relation in the formalization is
\n{'A',vp)
where A is a sentence provable from viewpoint vp by means of natural deduction 
techniques. Viewpoints denote sets of sentences which represent the axioms of 
a theory. Viewpoints are defined as a set of reified meta-level sentences.
Two important points from the paper are as follows:
• Attardi and Simi criticize the approaches of McCarthy [40] and Guha [24] 
for their support of lifting rules. Applying such rules in the reasoning, 
they exhibit the use of logical properties which subsume those required 
by Montague [41]. Thus, one can always obtain a paradoxical result in
[52], Shoham uses the K (knowledge) modality, but a similar discussion holds for other 
modalities such as belief, choice, etc.
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a system of the sort suggested by McCarthy (or Guha). In the formal­
ization of Attardi and Simi, this fact is kept in mind and a meta-level is 
introduced. Reasoning by using this meta-level over viewpoints and the 
object level is called contextual entailment.
• Since viewpoints are defined to be sets of reified sentences, operations 
between viewpoints are carried out via meta-level rules, e.g.,
in(^.e^г;pUfA^}) 
in('y4 B', vp)
This corresponds to the following (implication introduction) in classical 
logic:
vpO (A ) l· B 
up h (A —> B)
The eifective use of viewpoints in making useful proofs requires us to 
establish a connection between the meta-level and the object-level rules. 
The reflection rules below to do that:
vpi h in('A',up2) 
vpi U vp2 H A 




The notation \~c stands for “classically derivable” or “derivable without 
using the reflection rules.”
Attardi and Simi cite a wide range of examples using the viewpoints. For in­
stance, using viewpoints the notions of beliefi knowledge, truth, and situation!* 
can be formalized as follows:
• Belief: The belief of an agent g is captured by means of in sentences, 
using vp(g) as the viewpoint corresponding to the set of assumptions of 
the agent. Therefore,
Bel(p,A) =  in(A,up(p))
term situation is used in the Situation Theory sense.
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and, by the reflection rule
\n{A,vp{g)) -4 {vp{g) -4 A)
we can use the beliefs of an agent. When we accept this account, the 
viewpoint vp{g) corresponds to the set of beliefs of g and inferring a 
belief A from the beliefs of the agent is done by using the reflection rule.
• Truth: Truth is captured as provability in a special theory, viz. Real 
World (RW). Ideally, everything that is true should be derivable in this 
theory, and truth can be defined as
True(^) =  in(>l,RW)
When we accept this account of truth, our special theory RW should 
have the following properties: (i) consistency: the real world should be 
non-contradictory; (ii) completeness: anything is either true on not; (iii) 
veridicality: the set of assumptions of the real world are true. Using a 
similar reflection rule as in the belief part, the facts of the world can be 
used.
• Knowledge: Attardi and Simi view knowledge as true belief:
K(5i, A) =  Bel(5f, A) A True(A)
=  in(y4, vp{g)) A in(A, RW)
Clearly, all the properties usually ascribed to knowledge can be derived,
K(j, A) A
• Situations: Attardi and Simi take situations as sets of basic facts [12], 
and use an approach similar to that of belief. Thus, they define a basic 
relation
Holds(A, s) =  in(A, up(s))
where vp{s) is the set of facts holding in a situation s.
In our view, their formalizations of these notions are not fully satisfactory. 
First, the notions are treated in a dangerously synteictic way. Regarding all 
of the above notions solely in a natural deduction sense might cause loss of
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some of the philosophical properties of these notions [29]. Our second criticism 
has to do with their proposal for situations: situations are taken to be sets of 
sentences [20], but the language and the semantics of situations are completely 
ignored. After a brief introduction to Situation Theory in the next chapter, 
this last point will be clearer.
Chapter 4
The Situation Theoretic Approach
4.1 An Introduction to Situation Theory
4.1.1 History
Situation Theory is a principled programme to develop a unified mathematical 
theory of meaning and information content, and to apply that theory to specific 
areas of language, computation, and cognition. The basic ideas of the theory 
were first introduced by Barwise and Perry in the eighties in their influential 
book Situations and Attitudes [13]. Barwise and Etchemendy [12] brought 
together ideas from Situation Theory and Aczel’s work in set theory [1] to study 
semantical paradoxes. Barwise [10] applies Situation Theory to a variety of 
problems, including the semantics of natural language conditionals, the nature 
of constraints, and the characterization of common knowledge. Devlin gives 
the most up-to-date version of Situation Theory in his excellent book Logic 
and Information [20].
One of the most notable motivations of the theory is to provide a math­
ematical theory of meaning. There have been different approaches towards 
building theories of meaning. Some of these theories emphasized the power 
of language to classify minds, i.e., the mental significance of language, while 
others focused on the connections between language and the described world, 
i.e., the external significance of language. Barwise and Perry [13] claim that for
32
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an expression to have meaning, it should convey information^ They develop 
a theory of situations and of meaning as a relation between situations. The 
theory provides a system of abstract objects that make it possible to describe 
the meaning of both expressions and mental states in terms of the information 
they carry about the external world.
Devlin also regards Situation Theory as a theory of information. However, 
in his book, rather than trying to define information, he investigates the nature 
of information flow and the mechanisms that give rise to it.
4.1.2 Basic Situation Theory
The two major concepts of Situation Theory are infons and situations. Infons 
are the basic informational units. They should be considered as discrete items 
of information. Infons are denoted as <C Z’, oi, · ·. Onj * ^  where P  is an n-place 
relation, o i ,. . .a n  are objects appropriate for the respective argument places 
of P, and i is the polarity (0 or 1).
Situations are ‘first-class’ citizens of the theory, and are defined intension- 
ally. A situation is considered to be a structured part of the reality that an 
agent (somehow) manages to pick out or individuate. The only definition given 
at this level is that of the supports relation:
s supports a  (denoted s f= a) means that a  is an infon that is true 
of s.
It is desirable to have some computational tools to handle situations. Ab­
stract situations are the mathematical constructs which are more amenable 
to mathematical manipulation. An abstract situation is defined as a (possibly 
non-well-founded [1]) set of infons. Given a real situation s, the set {a  | s |= o:} 
is the corresponding abstract situation.
One of the important ideas behind Situation Theory is a schema of individu­
ation, a way of carving the world into ‘uniformities.’ The notions of individuals.
'Clearly, this is possible only if the expressions have a link with the kinds of events they 
describe and also a link with the states of mind.
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relations, spatial and temporal locations, and further entities depend upon this 
schema of individuation. Thus, the constituents of Situation Theory such as 
infons, constraints, and situations are determined by the agent’s schema of in­
dividuation. We will try to follow a rational agent’s (probably an agent having 
a reasonable math background) individuation schema in our examples.
Being constructs that link the schema of individuation to the technical 
framework of the theory, types are important features of Situation Theory. 
Types are higher-order uniformities which cut across uniformities such as in­
dividuals, relations, situations, and spatio-temporal locations. Just as individ­
uals, temporal locations, spatial locations, relations, and situations, types are 
also uniformities that are discriminated by agents. Relations may have their 
argument places filled either with individuals, situations, locations, and other 
relations, or with types of individuals, situations, locations, and relations.
In Situation Theory, for each type T, an infinite collection of parameters 
T i,T2, . . .  is introduced. For example IN D 3 is an 7A^Z)-parameter. These 
bring about some computational power, but we may demand more than that. 
Sometimes, rather than parameters ranging over all individuals, we need pa­
rameters that range over a more restricted class, viz. restricted parameters^. 
For example,
rl =  a I ■< kicking, a ,b ,l ^  
a =  INDZ  |<C man, INDZ, 1 ^  
b =  IN D2  I 'C  football, IN D 2 ,1 >·
In this case, r l ranges over all men kicking footballs.
Related to the parametric infons, there is a construct by which we can 
assign ‘values’ to parameters. We call this an anchor. Formally, an anchor for 
a set. A, of basic parameters is a function defined on A, which assigns to each 
parameter T,· in A an object of type T. Therefore, if /  is an anchor for A and 
T{ is a parameter in A, then
<  of-type,f{Ti),T , 1 »
^we represent restricted parameters witli a parameter nama which has a dot over it.
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For example, if /  anchors a to the type IN D 3 individual “Surav,” we write
/(a )  =  Surav
to denote this anchoring.
Object-types are determined over some initial situation. Let s be a given 
situation. If X is a parameter and /  is a set of infons (involving ¿ ), then there 
is a type
[x\s 1= /]
This is the type of all those objects to which x may be anchored in s, 
for which the conditions imposed by /  obtain. We refer to this process of 
obtaining a type from a parameter x, a situation s, and a set I  of infons, as 
type-abstraction, x is known as the abstraction parameter and s is known as 
the grounding situation.
In Situation Theory, the flow of information is realized via constraints. We 
represent a constraint with
involves, So, ^i, 1 >
where and are situation-types between which the information is carried 
out. Cognitively, if this relation holds, then it is a fact that if is realized 
(i.e., there is a real situation sq : 5'o), then so is Si (i.e., there is a real situation 
Si : iSi). For example, with the following constraint c, we might represent the 
regularity “Smoke means fire” :^
50 =  [s|i [=<C smoke-present, I, t, 1
51 =  [s|s [=■< fire-present, I, t, 1 >>] 
c =<C involves. So, ^i, 1 >·
Let us return to the relation between types and propositions. Representa­
tion of propositions is an important issue for us. In this discussion, the role of
^Barwise [8] investigates conditional knowledge and its dependence upon circumstantial 
information. Since conditionals are tightly related to constraints, we will stop the discussion 
here and continue when we review Barwise’s contributions in the next section.
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the grounding situation becomes more apparent. Basically, in Situation Theory 
the information is taken into account in an “atomic” fashion, i.e., information 
at the level of the relation provided by the individuation schema. In other 
words, information is regarded as essentially propositional: “information” is 
information about some situation s. This either has the form
s : S
where s is a situation and .S' is a situation-type, or else
x : T
where x  is an object and T is an object-type defined over some grounding 
situation u. In the latter case, if
T — [¿|u 1= a]
then X :T  ii and only if
«  h  < [^f]
where f { x )  =  x. Thus all propositions are essentially of the form
< situation > 1= < infon >
4.2 Barwise on Contexts
Barwise’s ideas on circumstance, thus on context, arise from his work on con­
ditionals and circumstantial information [8]. Barwise states two innovative ex­
amples, one on a missing pollen and the other on the (wrong) proof of 1 =  — 1.
Example 1: Missing Pollen.
Let us consider Claire (Barwise’s then nine-month old daughter). Barwise 
knows that if Claire rubs her eyes, then she is sleepy. This is expressed by the 
general conditional statement
If Claire rubs her eyes, then she is sleepy.
For months, this was a sound piece of (conditional) knowledge that Barwise 
and his wife used to understand Claire, and learn when they should put her
CHAPTER 4. THE SITUATION THEORETIC APPROACH 37
to bed. However, in the early summer, it began to fail them. Combined with 
other symptoms, Barwise and his wife eventually figured out that Claire was 
allergic to something or other. They called it Pollen X since they did not know 
the exact name. So Pollen X could also cause Claire to rub her eyes.
Example 2: Proof of 1 =  — 1
We will give a very simple ‘proof’ that 1 =  — 1, which uses (or rather, misuses) 
true conditional statements and the usual laws of equality. In the proof, i 
represents y / ^ , so that i x  t =  —1. We will also use the fact that y/T =  1. 
Now,
I f  X =  a ■ b, then y/x =  y/a · Vb (4.1)
I f  X — I and a = —I and 6 =  —1, then x =  a -b  (4.2)
From these true statements, and the laws of equality, we can conclude, 
using the Hypothetical Syllogism, that
I f  X =  1 and a =  —I and b =  —1, then x =  —1.
Barwise approaches the problems stated in the above examples as follows. 
Briefly, with constraint (7 =  [5 => 5”'], a real situation s contains information 
relative to such an actual constraint (7, if s : S. clearly, s may contain various 
pieces of information relative to C, but the most general proposition that s 
contains, relative to C, is that s' is realized, where s' : S'.
Thus we can represent the information that “If Claire rubs her eyes, then 
she is sleepy” with the following parametric constraint C  (with unspecified 
time and location parameters);
S =  [s|i f=<C ru6s, Claire, Claire’s eyes,/, i, 1 ;>]
S' =  [i|s sleepy., Claire,/,/, 1 > ]
C =  [.S S']
Before Pollen X was present, the above constraint represented a reasonable 
account. However, when Pollen X arrived, the constraint became inadequate
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and required revision. Barwise points out to two alternatives to deal with the 
problem:
• From [if (f> then V»] infer [if (j> and /?, then tp],
• From [if (p then tp] infer [if then if <p then tp]
where ^ corresponds to the additional background conditions.
Barwise chooses the second way to deal with the problem^ and modifies 
the involves relation, and makes the background assumptions implicit by in­
troducing a third parameter. The involves relation now becomes:
<C involves, Si, S2, 5 ,1 >
For example, with the new involves relation, the Missing Pollen Example 
can be solved via the introduction of a background condition, which supports 
the following:
■C exists. Pollen X, /, i, 0 ^
Barwise enumerates the following five assumptions that govern the new 
involves relation:
1. If B  is fixed, then the resulting two-place relation is transitive, i.e., 5'i =>■ 
S2\B and S2 => SslB then Si => S-jIB. (This is why the Hypothetical 
Syllogism is valid as long as the background conditions do not vary.)
2. If a conditional constraint holds relative to some B  and B  is tightened, 
then the constraint holds relative to the more restrictive type of situation 
B', i.e., if 5" S'\B and B' C B, where B' is compatible with S, then 
S S'\B\
^Although, these alternatives are equivalent from a logical point of view, the second is 
more appropriate to reflect the intuitions behind the background conditions. In the first case, 
the constraint (i.e., if <f> then ip) is directly modified to use background conditions, whereas, 
in the second case, the constraint is not touched, but is evaluated only when background 
conditions hold. Introduction of background conditions for constraints corresponds to a 
non-monotonic reasoning mechanism.
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3. if 5  S'\B then S is compatible with B, i.e., S C\ B is not incoherent®.
4. if 5  S'\B and /  is a coherent parameter anchor for some of the pa­
rameters of B, then S {f)  => S '{f)\B {f).
5 . a  S => S'\B where B  has no parameters, and if B  is realized by some
real situation, then 5“ 5 ' is actual.
These properties form a basis for our notion of context. Our aim in this 
thesis is to design our contexts so that the above properties apply to lifting 
operations between contexts.
Returning to Barwise, the two examples are now revisited with additional 
light shed by the new involves relation.
Example 1: Missing Pollen.
We can reformulate the problem using a background condition (J3):
S =  [i|s [=-C rubs, Claire, Claire’s eyes,/, i, 1 >►]
S' =  [s|s |=<C s/eepy, Claire,/,/, 1 > ]
B  =  [s|s |=<C exists, Pollen X, /, i, 0 >·]
C =  [ S ^
In this example, B  will be the conditions to be supplied by the grounding 
situation, and thus by the context. We will review this example once again in 
Section 5.2.2, and give a context which has this information.
Example 2: Proof of 1 =  — 1.
In the example, the conditional which depends on the environmental factors,
i.e., the constraint effected from the situation shift, is Equation 4.1. This 
constraint can be modeled by C:
S =  [ i|5 [=<C product, a, b, x, 1 > ]
®Here, the term incoherent is used in the sense that SO B  does not contain any contra­
dictory infons, i.e., <  R, ...,0 >  and <  R , ..., 1 >  do not occur together in 5  n 5  for any 
R.
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S' =  [¿|i product, Vd, \Jh, y/i, 1 >·]
B =  [¿|i !=·< All numbers are positive real numbers 
C =<C involves, S, S', B , 1  ^  
where B  might be explicitly represented using C b - 
Sb =  [•s|'S N'C number, a, 1 
S'b =  [i|-s 1="  ^real, a, 1 ^  A i  |=<C positive, a, 1
and
Cb = <  involves, Sb , S'g, Bb , 1 >
B ^ C b
Here, Bb is yet another background condition®.
®This is not important in our example, and we will not describe it. However, if one 
requires to state a background condition for Cb , he can freely do that.
Chapter 5
Our Proposal
In this chapter, we will detail our approach and present a model for context 
in the framework of Situation Theory. In Section 5.1, we will describe our 
formalization, and show that it is as powerful as the other approaches in the 
literature vis-à-vis the desired properties of context. In Section 5.2, we will 
present the examples that we promised in the previous chapters.
5.1 Motivation
The main purposes of our proposal may be categorized into three:
1. Offering a representation schema which allows the contexts of Logic, Rea­
soning, and Natural Language in a uniform way.
2. Defining a representation schema which supports the essential properties 
of context. These properties were explained in Chapters 3 and 4.
3. Clarifying the notion of context and reducing the problem to a computer 
science (or mathematics) problem. As future work, the implementation 
of the proposal might be considered.
We will approach context as an amalgation of grounding situation and the 
rules which govern the relations within the context. Thus we will represent a 
context by a situation type which supports two types of infons:
41
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• parameter free infons to state the facts and the usual bindings.
• parametric infons (which correspond to parametric conditionals repre­
senting infons to represent the if-then relations and axioms within the 
context).
Thus, the context of an M.S. Thesis Presentation can be formulated with 
the following situation-theoretic constructs. Let c be Surav’s M.S. Thesis Pre­
sentation context. This context supports some infons to represent the basic 
facts, and constitutes the basis for parameter binding. Some of the infons are
c |=<C school., Bilkent, 1
c |=<C department., Computer Engineering, 1 ^  
c |=<C ms-student, Surav, 1 
c [=·< ms-advisor, Akman, 1 






Within this context, we have some natural regularities valid for all thesis 
presentation contexts, such as
Si [=<; ms-advisor, a, 1 ^ (5.6)
S2 [=<C ms-jury-member, d, 1 >■ (5.7)
Cl =  [5i ^  5215] (6.8)
1 situation such as
B  |=«C school, Bilkent, 1 ^ (5.9)
The constraint Ci can be represented with the following infon:
Cl |=<C involves, S\, S2, B >■ (5.10)
The second part, i.e., the set of infons in Equations 5.6-5.10, intuitively 
states that thesis advisors of are also jury members in M.S. Thesis Presentation
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contexts (in Bilkent). Using the above context as a grounding situation with 
the anchoring
/ ( ¿ )  =  Akman,
we can conclude that Akman is also a jury member.
After this introductory example, let us review the desired properties of 
context, and check whether our proposal supports them.
During the review of McCarthy’s work (cf. Section 3.1), the very first 
property we stated was that contexts are first class objects, so that we can 
use them in the same way as other objects. In our approach, we are modeling 
contexts with situation types, and situation types are situations which have 
some unbound parameters. Other than having unbound parameters, situation 
types are ordinary situations, and thus first class objects of Situation Theory. 
(Having unbound parameters does not cause any problem.)
Richness of the contexts was stated by McCarthy [38, 40] and Guha [24]. In 
Situation Theory, situations are, by definition, rich objects [20, 12] (cf. Section 
3.1 for the definition of rich object.). The richness of situations covers the 
partiality of contexts as McCarthy desires.
Another aspect of the use of context is the flexibility of having private 
rules and presuppositions related to a particular viewpoint. In the logicist 
approach, presuppositions were represented with predicates which contain no 
variables (either bound or unbound) and rules were represented with quantified 
logical implications:
c : present(Air) 
c : Vx bird{x) —+ flies {x )
(5.11)
(5.12)
Equation 5.11 states that air is present (a presupposition), and Equation 
5.12 states that if something is a bird, it flies (a default rule). The same 
capability is also available in our notion of context. In Situation Theory, we 
represent the facts related to a particular context with parameter free infons 
supported by the situation type which corresponds to the context. The rules 
of the context are represented by the constraints. Since constraints are allowed 
to be parametric, we can easily use them as rules related to the context. The
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above examples might then be restated as the following situation-theoretic 
constructs:
Sc present, Air, 1 > (5.13)
Si =  [i|s |=< bird, a, 1 >
S2 =  [¿li f= <  flies, a, 1 >  
Sc 1=*  ^ involves. Si, 82,1 >
(5.14)
Here, the fact that air is present is represented with the infon in Equation
5.13, and the rule that birds fly is represented with the constraint in Equation
5.14. Therefore, we can use the situation type Sc as as the context of the 
logicist approach (namely, context c).
Another way of using the context is to fill in the missing parameters of 
statements in natural language^. We will not consider transferring natural 
language statements to logic, but only present the way we can use it in our 
model. Since we will give an example in Section 5.2.5, we will only study why 
our model is capable of realizing the appropriate parameter filling task, for the 
moment.
A related issue is the background information. In his paper “Conditionals 
and Conditional Information” [8], Barwise points out the importance of the 
background information in the involves (=^) relation. In our model, the context 
representation is designed to supply adequate background information.
Consider the context of M.S. Thesis presentation stated in the beginning of 
this chapter. In this context, the advisor of the thesis is also a jury member of 
the thesis. This rule is stated formally via ci in Equation 5.8. In the constraint, 
the background condition is that the school is Bilkent University. This is stated 
by using В  of Equation 5.9. In our definition of context, supplying this kind
^The task of fUling the missing parameters is in fact a matching between the objects 
available in the context and the missing parameters. To simplify the problem, the objects 
of the context might be partitioned into particular types. (With this partitioning, we might 
reduce the search space.) In the case of ordinary (unsorted) FOL, since we have no type 
casting over the objects, the search space is large and since matching is an NP-complete 
problem, doing it is a time consuming process. However, in Situation Theory, since the 
objects are type cast, this process becomes simpler and can effectively be used in practice. 
(The example “Carl Lewis is running.” o f Section 5.2.5 corresponds to this.) Note that, 
hnding the appropriate anchoring function is still a difficult task.
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of background information is simple (and in fact necessary). We will give an 
example in Section 5.2.5.
Another natural language construct related to context is the indexical. We 
have promised in Chapter 2 (cf. the example “I am a philosopher” ) that our 
notion of context will be capable of dealing with indexicals. What we do is an 
adaptation of the previous approaches to our notion of context. This is not 
difficult, since our contexts are, in some sense, situations. When we review the 
example “I am a philosopher” in Section 5.2.5, we will demonstrate how we 
use our model for the task of matching indexicals.
Contexts define the domain of quantification. This property of context is 
due to its use as a grounding situation, so that in the binding of parameters, 
the only available objects are those available in the context.
By lifting, we can use some axioms from one context in another context. 
The issue of lifting is raised in the logicist approach. Lifting rules (whether 
non-monotonic or not) are always stated in the outer one of the two contexts 
between which the lifting will be done. In our case, lifting has similar proper­
ties. Lifting rules are stated in an outer context and are non-monotonic.
Basically, we will state lifting rules as constraints. Non-monotonicity of the 
lifting will be realized by the background conditions in the involves relation.
Let Cl and C2 be the contexts between which the lifting is to be done. Let 
C  be the outer context. Let us state a lifting rule (C below) to lift relation foo 
from context Ci to relation bar in context C2:
51 =  [i| Cl |=< / 00, à, 1 > ]
52 =  [¿I C2 bar, à, 1 > ]




B  is the background condition, which enables us to have non-monotonicity 
while lifting.
Regarding lifting, there are some discrepancies between our approach and 
the logicist one. Namely, in the logicist approach we can change the arity
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of a relation while lifting; in our approach this is not allowed. This is not 
due to a limitation on our part, but is rather due to the philosophy behind 
Situation Theory. In Situation Theory we use an individuation mechanism to 
name objects, individuals, events, situations, and so on. One application area 
of the individuation mechanism is relations. For example, if we individuate the 
on relation with two parameters as
•C on,à, b, 1 > (5.18)
we always consider on with two parameters, i.e., in all situations and groundings 
we use on with this fixed number of parameters. In the logicist way, on is taken 
in a syntactic sense, and in some contexts it might require two parameters, 
while in some other contexts it might require three (for example, the third 
parameter might correspond to time). Although Situation Theory seems to be 
weaker at first regard, it in fact gives us the mechanisms to compensate for 
this weakness. In the on example, we can compensate the requirement for time 
in one context by simply stating an infon, which enables us to represent the 
dependence on time.
Regarding Guha’s discussions on lifting, the intuitions default coreference, 
compositionality, and coherence should also be guaranteed (cf. Section 3.2). 
In the framework of Situation Theory, coherence is not a problem, since the 
meanings of relations are determined by the schema of individuation. As for 
the compositionality, the basic unit of information in Situation Theory is the 
infon, and constraints are the way to the building of formulas. In the lifting of 
formulas, it is not enough for us to lift only infons; we also require the lifting 
of constraints. Finally, default coreference does not apply to Situation Theory.
5.2 Examples
After the statement of the properties of our formal context, we now show how 
it works for the various examples from the literature. In previous chapters, we 
have reviewed the relevant works, but have left the analysis of the examples to 
this chapter. We will begin with an example due to McCarthy. This is rather 
longish but is the most significant outcome of our proposal, since it creates a 
parallelism between predicate calculus and Situation Theory. In the remaining
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examples, we will show that our notion of context is adequate to deal with 
various kinds of context-dependent problems (from natural language, logic, 
categorization, etc.).
5.2.1 McCarthy’s Lifting Example
In [40], McCarthy states the following example in his “Lifting Rules” section. 
Here, we will first present the original example, and then re-do it in our version 
of formal context.
McCarthy uses the blocks world to state his example.
Original Lifting Example.
McCarthy considers two contexts, namely, Above-Theory (AT) and c. Above- 
Theory is the context which contains some simple blocks-world assumptions, 
similar to Equations 5.19-5.20. In AT, the notion of situation is undefined. 
However, the context c supports the situations, and the predicates usually 
have an additional parameter for the situation. For example on(x, y) becomes 
on (x ,y ,s), where s corresponds to the situation in which on{x,y) holds. In 
c, context-oJ{s) is a function, which returns a specialization (in some sense a 
sub-context) of c, where the situation is fixed to s. The lifting rules working be­
tween c and one of its specializations are presented as Equations 5.21 and 5.22. 
Equation 5.23 is the major lifting axiom, which links AT  and the sub-contexts 
of c. The example in McCarthy [40] is the proof that from is t(c , on(i4, B, So)) 
we can prove that is t (c ,a 6oue(.d, B, Sq)). In the proof, cq is the outer context. 
The axioms are the following^:
Co : AT : VxVy on{x,y) above(x,y) (5.19)
Co : A T : 'ix 'iy 'iz  above{x,y) A a b o v e {y ,z )a b o v e {x ,z )  (5.20) 
Co; c :  VxVj/Vs on {x ,y ,s) i-* ist{context-of {s ),on {x ,y )) (5.21)
^As a reminder, the formula is t(c ,p ) can also be represented as c : p. This states that 
predicate p holds in context c.
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Co : c : Va: Vj/Vs above{x,y,s)
ist{context-of(s).,above(x,y))
Co : c : VpVs is t(A T ,p ) ist(con text-of(s),p )
(5.22)
(5.23)
The proof proceeds as follows:
Co : c : OTi(A, B, Sq)
Co : c : ist(context-of(S o),on(A ,B )) 




Co : c : ist(con text-o f(S o),W x'iyon (x ,y )-^ a bove(x ,y )) (5.27)
Co : c : context-of (^o) : above(A, B) 
Co : c : above(A, B, So)
(5.28)
(5.29)
Equation 5.24 is the assumption given in the beginning. Equation 5.25 
is obtained from Equations 5.21 and 5.24 by binding A to x, B  to y, and 
So to s. Equation 5.26 obtained from Equation 5.25 by entering the context 
context-of (So). Equation 5.27 is the result of lifting Equation 5.19 by the lifting 
axiom (Equation 5.23). From Equations 5.26 and 5.27, we obtain Equation 
5.28. The desired equation 5.29 is obtained from Equations 5.28 and 5.22. 
This proof is summarized in Figure 5.1. In the figure, contexts are represented 
as Venn diagrams. Atomic formulas are represented with capital letters, and 
transfers between contexts (i.e., the lifting rules) are represented by arrows. 
We have labeled arrows in the way the proof ‘grows.’ If we look at the proof 
from a conceptual level, McCarthy is drawing a virtual link from the atomic 
formula X  to the atomic formula V. Since, c has no rule to draw a link from X  
to V, we first create the context context-of (So), and draw a link to the atomic 
formula Y  using the lifting rule in Equation 5.21. After Y, McCarthy lifts the 
implication of above(x,y) from on(x,y) (the arc labeled with 3 in the figure) 
to context-of (So) (i.e., he forms the link 6). Then from Y, by tracing link 6, 
we get U. From U, by leaving context-of (So) , we can get the desired formula 
V.
IAPTER5. OUR PROPOSAL 49
Co
X: on (A. B. So)
Y: on (A. B)
Z: on (A, B)
T: above (A, B)
U: above(A, B)
V: above (A, B, Sq)
Figure 5.1. Diagram of McCarthy’s proof
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As the reader may notice, in the proof of McCarthy, it is more natural to 
use the path 1-2-3-4-5. However, this path requires one more lifting rule to 
transfer Y  to Z  (link 2). In Attardi and Simi’s work [6], this link is explicitly 
stated and a proof is carried out with the path 1-2-3-4-5.
We can rework this example within our framework. The main difference 
between the statement of McCarthy and ours will be in the language used. We 
will use Situation Theory to state the example, and will be required to make 
the following changes:
• Logical implications (such as Equation 5.19) will be represented with 
constraints.
• In McCarthy’s original example, on has different arities in different con­
texts, i.e., in AT  its arity is two whereas in c its arity is three. However, 
in Situation Theory, we are required to refer to on in different contexts 
with different names^.
• context-of (So) function of McCarthy will be represented with the infons
of type
<C context-of, A, 5 ,1  >■
where A is a parameter which is of type situation (of Situation Calculus) 
and 5  is a parameter of type situation (of Situation Theory), which 
corresponds to A.
• The contexts Cq, c , and AT  of McCarthy will be represented with the 
contexts Sco, Cc, and cat, respectively. In fact, all of the equations in 
the sequel are supported by the situation Sco- (This situation will be the 
outermost grounding situation in our proof.)
• The background conditions Bat , Be-at, Bat-c* will not be explicitly stated
^Once again, the reason behind this change is the schema of individuation used when we 
identify the on relation. Basically, on in context AT has no notion of situation, but on in 
context c has this notion. In this case, we cannot refer to the first on in the same way as 
we refer to the second. Thus, we will name our on relations as on at and on«. Note that we 
cannot simply regard on^r as on« with a missing parameter (cf. discussion on schema of 
individuation in Section 4.1.2).
^Bat is the background condition used in the constraint in AT, Be-at is the background 
condition used in lifting from c to AT, and Bat-c is the background condition used in lifting 
from AT to c.
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in the proof, since the original proof does not involve any non-monotonic 
inference.
The axioms and assumptions of McCarthy will be represented with the 
following situation-theoretic constructs:
Sn =  [i|s |=< ouat , X, y, 1 > ]
Si2 =  [¿|i aboveAT,x,y, 1 > ]  (5.30)
Cat h <  involves, Sn, Sn, Bat >
S21 =  [¿|i |=< abovtAT, y, 1 >  A s [= <  abovtAT, y, ¿, 1 '>]
S22 =  [¿M aboveAT,i,z,\ > ]  
Cat involves, S21, S22, Bat >
S31 =  [ ¿ l i  h <  5^1,1 > ]
Cat =  [¿Is |=< (^AT, i ,  y, 1 > ]
Cc |=«C context-of,s,S3i,l ^
Cc |=< involves, S31, Cat, Be-at >
S31 =  [s|s [ = <  a b o v e c ,x ,y ,S 4 i, l > ]  
Cat =  [s|s |=< aboveAT,i,y, 1 > ]
Cc |=<C context-of,s,S4i,l > ·
Cc [= <  involves, S41, Cat, BcrAT >  
Cat h
Cc |=<C context-of,s,S5i,l 
S5I





In addition to McCarthy’s axioms, we will need a further rule to lift facts 
from Cat to Ce. This is the following constraint:
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Sei =  [i|i |=< abovec,x,y,S6iA  > ]
Ca t  =  [¿M |= <  aboveAT,x,y, 1 » ]
Cc context-of,s,sei, 1 >
Cc |=< involves, Cat, Sei, Bat-c >
In McCarthy, we have the following
Co : ist(c, on(/4,5 , i'o)).
(5.35)
(5.36)
This can be represented with the following infon
(To = <  one, A, B, So, 1 >
and then Equation 5.36 corresponds to the following:
C c  ^  O'o (5.37)
In Situation Theory, this kind of logical proof corresponds to finding the 
anchoring function, by which we can show that Cc also supports the predicate 
to be proven, i.e., we must show that
Cc B , So, 1 (5.38)
In the proof, we will first transfer the fact to cat, then reason that on 
implies above, and carry this new fact to Cc. This is the path 1-2-3-4-5 in 
Figure 5.1.
Using the constraint of Equation 5.32 with the following anchoring
/ l ( i )  =
M i )  =  A 
M y )  =  B
we transfer <C oU c,A ,B ,So,l ^  from Cc to <C ovat. A, B ,l  ^  in cat- This 
corresponds to tracing links 1 and 2 in Figure 5.1. Note that, we did not
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lose the parameter So, since we will use the same anchoring function when we 
return to Cc. In Cat , using the following anchoring
/2(x) =  A 
f 2{y) =  B
and Equation 5.30, we get <  abovcAT, A, B, 1 > .  This corresponds to link 3 in 
Figure 5.1. After this implication of above from on, we should transfer the fact 
to Cc. This is done using Equation 5.35 with f i .  The result of this operation 
is <C abovec,A ,B ,So,l This completes the proof path 1-2-3-4-5 in Figure 
5.1. Once more, by using one constraint, we have traced two links, namely, 4 
and 5, in Figure 5.1. During this pass, we are in fact referring to U, when we 
use fi.
Consequently, using two anchoring functions ( /i  grounded at the outer­
most context Sco, and /2 grounded at cat), we have carried out the proof of 
McCarthy in our situation-theoretic framework.
5.2.2 Examples from Barwise
Missing Pollen.
The following are the constituents of the constraint C, which was the solution 
to the missing pollen problem:
S =  [s|s [=<C ru6s, Claire, Claire’s eyes,/, ¿, 1 (5.39)
S' =  [¿|i )= <  sleepy, Claire,/, i, 1 > ]  (5.40)
B =  [i|i |=<C exists. Pollen X, /, i, 0 (5-41)
C involves, S, S', B ,\ '^  (5.42)
At the beginning it was winter and there were no pollens. The context of 
the talk, call it ci, must be a situation type which supports
Cl ^<C exists. Pollen X, /, i, 0 ^
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(and possibly other things related to Claire, rubbing one’s eyes, etc.). Using 
context Cl as the grounding situation, we do not violate® the background condi­
tion B  (Equation 5.41) of constraint C  (Equation 5.42), and thus can conclude 
that “Claire is sleepy.”
Later, in summer, the new context, call it C2, supports the infon 
C2 1=·^ exists, Pollen X, /, t, 1 ^
and when we use C2 as the grounding situation, we are faced with an inconsis­
tency between B  and C2. Therefore, C  becomes void for the new context of the 
talk, and the conclusion “Claire is sleepy” becomes cannot be reached/proved.
1 =  — 1 Example.
This is similar to the above example. In the (wrong) proof of 1 =  —1, there 
exists a conflict between the context of the proof and the background condition 
of the constraint, which leads to this false equality.
5.2.3 Perspectives Example
In Chapter 2, we pointed out that interpretations of some words directly depend 
upon context. In Figure 2.1, we have used the following sentence to exemplify 
this:
Engineering Building is to the left of the Library.
Similar issues are raised by Seligman and Barwise [48, 14, 49] who present 
more mathematical approaches based on the flow of information [21]. In addi­
tion to the above works, our account of context may also be used to present a 
satisfactory way of modeling these issues®.
Let A be an agent looking towards the Engineering Building from the
®Since we are using background conditions eis a tool for non-monotonicity, we are looking 
for the opposites of the background conditions to appear in the context. If we do not find 
any opposite in the context, we conlude that background conditions are not being violated. 
®Our approach does not analyze the problem, but offers an ad hoc solution.
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Tourism School, and B  be another agent looking from the Publishing Com­
pany. Let ca and cb denote the contexts of A  and B, respectively. In c^, we 
have the following information:
<C left-of, Engineering Building, Library,! >  (5.43)
•C looking-from, Tourism School,! ^
In Cb , we have
<  right-of, Engineering Building, Library,! >




Now, the relations left-of and right-of become non-problematic, since the 
context will be significant as a grounding situation in interpretations of sen­
tences. Thus, the utterance “Engineering Building is to the left of the Library” 
is supported in ca, but is not supported in cb-
5.2.4 The Springfield Example
In the Springfield barbers example [2, 55], our solution was to introduce of 
a context-dependent membership. However, with the availability of a formal 
notion of context, we do not need any additional construct, or modification in 
the membership relation.
In the example, the number of barbers at Springfield was different when 
looked at it from a commonsense point of view and from a legal point of view. 
Both of the views corresponds to different contexts, and if we accept this, we 
can still be consistent with these different numbers. In the statement of the 
example, there Wcis a barber who does not work for money, but serves the 
community by cutting their hair and shaving them. Let this person be John, 
the librarian of the town.
In the context of the commonsense view, call it ccs, we have the following
CCS barber, John, ! >·
Ccs !=·< librarian, John, I >·
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In the government agencies’ view, the context of the talk, call it cga, will 
only have the following
coA f=·^ librarian, John, 1 ^
In this case, when one does a counting from a commonsense point of view, 
he uses ccs  as the grounding situation. In the case of the government agencies 
view, cqa will be used as the grounding situation in the counting, and the 
number of barbers will be one less than the number of barbers obtained by the 
commonsense view.
5.2.5 Natural Language Examples
In this section, we will review some of the natural language examples we have 
introduced in the previous sections of this thesis. The only new one is the final 
example which is a typical non-monotonic reasoning example.
I am a philosopher.
The first point of our discussion was the context dependency of the word 
“philosopher” (cf. Chapter 2). Since, the conversation has no fruitful point­
ers to extract the meaning of the word philosopher, we will not discuss the 
meaning of it, but we will try to prove another fact: the content of all three 
sentences are the same, i.e., A is a philosopher. In dealing with this issue, we 
will also study the use of indexicals in our model.
We might have three contexts associated with each individual in the con­
versation. We will call these contexts Cyi, cb, and cc, respectively. We will 
represent the indexicals with special parameters I , Y  ou, and She which corre­
spond to I, you, and she, respectively.
In c^, we have the following infons supported:
<C corresponds, I ,A,  \
•C philosopher, 1 , 1  ^
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where corresponds is a function which associates an indexical to a person, 
and utterances about being a philosopher are represented with infons of type 
•C philosopher., 1
cb supports the following:
<C corresponds, She, A, 1 ;>·
•C philosopher. She, 1
cc  supports
•C corresponds, You, /1,1 
•C philosopher, You, 1 ^
The problem is to find the anchoring function. In this case, we have to 
believe that the above conversation is correctly transcribed, so that who is 
talking to whom is, by assumption, correctly stated. Now, it is a trivial matter 
to observe that I, You, and She all collapse to A, i.e., the anchoring
/ ( / )  =  A
f(Y ou ) =  B
fiS he) =  C
Consequently, the utterance of A might be de-contextualized as
philosopher, A ,\ ^  (5-47)
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Lewis is Running.
In Chapter 2, we have stated that context might be used to fill the missing 
parameters of some actions in natural language utterances. For example, in
Carl Lewis is running
we can fill the place and time of the action if we know that we are watching 
Lewis on TV at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. Let c be the context of 
the above talk which supports the following infons:
•C championship., Olympic Games, 1 





Using the commonsense rule “a running action takes place in the location 
of the championship,” we can fill the missing parameters of running with the 
place and time of the championship available in c. Thus, we get
running, Lewis, Barcelona, 1992,1 (5.51)
Non-monotonicity.
In Equation 5.12, if x is somehow bound to a non-flying bird like a penguin, 
this implication is invalidated using some non-monotonic techniques (e.g., cir­
cumscription [37], default reasoning [46], etc.).
As we have stated before, in Situation Theory, we represent implications 
with constraints. While stating the constraints, we can use background condi­
tions to add a non-monotonicity feature;
S\ =  [¿ji [=<C bird,x, 1 >·]
S2 =  [ij-s flies,X , 1 > ]
B =  [s| s (=C  penguin, x ,0 >
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C  =<C involves, Si,S2, 5 ,1  > (5.55)
The constraint C  states that every bird flies unless it is a penguin or there 
is no air. Here, the important contribution of the situation-theoretic account is 
that the environmental factors can be easily included in the reasoning phcise by 
suitably varying B. Therefore, within an appropriately defined context, these 
kind of constraints can be effectively used.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have proposed a formalization of context using Situation 
Theory. Although we have not stated a specific area of application, the new 
formalism might be useful for Natural Language Semantics, Reasoning in AI, 
and Categorization tasks (possibly with some slight revisions). The purpose of 
our formalization was to build a mathematical basis for the notion of context, 
which can effectively be used in the above areas.
In the literature, there are number of attempts towards a formalization of 
context in a logicist framework. Our approach differs from most of these ap­
proaches on being stated in the framework of Situation Theory. Our approach 
is primarily an extension of Barwise’s conception of context. In [8], Barwise 
uses grounding situations similar to our contexts. However, in his work, the 
content of the grounding situations is not fully described. In our work, we are 
explicitly stating what a context includes: parameter free infons to state the 
facts and the usual bindings, and parametric infons to state if-then relations 
(cf. Section 5.1 for full definition ). From Barwise’s work, we could not get 
any intuition of particular in-context rules.
The comparison of the previous approaches and our approach is summarized 
in Table 6.1 where the first line categorizes the language of statement. Except 
for Barwise [8], all of the previous approaches were stated in a more or less 
logicist framework. Among these, only Shoham proposes context as a modal 
operator; the other logicists consider context in a natural deduction sense, and 
allow operations of entering/leaving contexts.
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Mc87 Mc93 Gu91 Ba86 Sh91 BM93 AS93 Ours
Logic vs. 
Situation Theory Logic Logic Logic S.T. Logic Logic Logic S.T.
Modal Treatment No No No No Yes No No No
Natural Deduction Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Paradox Free No No No Yes Yes
Legend:
Mc87 McCarthy: Generality in AI [38]
Mc93 McCarthy: Notes on formalizing context [40]
Gu91 Guha: A formalization of contexts [24]
Ba86 Barwise: Constraints and conditional information [8]
Sh91 Shoham: Varieties of context [52]
BM93 Buvac and Mason: Propositional logic of context [18]
AS93 Attardi and Simi: A formalization of viewpoints [5]
Ours This thesis
Table 6.1. Comparison of the previous approaches and our approach
Among the previous approaches, McCarthy’s and Cuba’s are not paradox 
free, whereas Buvac and Mason’s, and Attardi and Simi’s approaches are para­
dox free. We do not know whether Barwise’s, Shoham’s, and our approaches 
are paradox free or not. However, in a thought-provoking work [12], Situation 
Theory is shown to be powerful enough to deal with circularity.
Compared to other approaches, our approach has the following notable 
properties (some advantageous, some not): •
• Allowing dynamic contexts: In our approach, we might easily require the 
content of a context change dynamically. We can add (delete) assump­
tions and rules into (from) a context.
Having a dynamic notion of context is not a novel thing for the logi- 
cist approaches, since one can always add (delete) axioms into (from) a 
theory. However, when we fortify our context with dynamic constraints 
whose background conditions are dynamic, we get non-monotonicity in 
the framework of Situation Theory (cf. “A non-monotonic reasoning ex­
ample” from Section 5.2).
• Simpler natural language interfaces: Situation Theory supports a more 
natural outlook regarding natural language concepts. Thus, our approach
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 62
might lead to a simpler interface in natural language applications.
• Extensions to temporal domain: In the statement of our proposal, we 
have not dealt with temporal relations. In Guha’s work [24], most of the 
examples are related to time. As a future work, the study of the temporal 
relations and information within our contexts might be useful. •
• The need for a Situation Theory tool: Since we are using a situation 
theoretic framework, we should have a programming environment for 
Situation Theory. There are two serious attempts to do this: BABY-SIT 
[59] and PROSIT [42].
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